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INTRODUCTION
Free speech controversies on college and university campuses have
resulted in a steady stream of media headlines.1 U.S. Attorney General Jeff
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1. See, e.g., Nicholas B. Dirks, The Real Issue in the Campus Speech Debate: The
University is Under Assault, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/09/the-real-issue-in-the-campus-speech-debate-the-universityis-under-assault/?utm_term=.1aa36d34d1bb (arguing that challenges to free speech from the
“extreme” right and left present a fundamental challenge to the concept of the appropriate
role of a university); Christine Hauser, Campuses Grapple with Balancing Free Speech and
Security after Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/
us/texas-aandm-speaking-policy-richard-spencer.html (considering how allowing speakers
must be balanced against campus safety issues); Elliot C. McLaughlin, War on Campus: The
Escalating Battle over College Free Speech, CNN (May 1, 2017, 12:04 PM),
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Sessions has decried colleges and universities as largely antagonistic to free
speech and pledged involvement by the U.S. Department of Justice on this
perceived issue.2 Previously, white nationalists used inflammatory speech
and actions to intimidate students and others at the University of Virginia and
surrounding areas of campus.3 The events in Charlottesville, Virginia,
prompted several universities to, at least initially, deny Richard Spencer, a
proponent of white supremacy, permission to speak on their campuses.4 In
another high-profile incident, students sought to disrupt a talk by Charles
Murray, a political scientist and conservative author, at Middlebury College.5
Student disruptions and riots also broke out at the University of California at
Berkeley over separate planned appearances by contentious political
commentators Ann Coulter6 and Milo Yiannopolous.7 These and other
controversies have created sharp debates over the extent to which colleges
and universities should be able to limit potentially objectionable speech on
campus.
While recent incidents have garnered headlines, institutions have
long struggled to balance their commitments to free speech with other
prerogatives, such as the advancement of diversity and social justice goals,
or managing events so as to not disrupt other campus functions. In debates
over campus speech, both old and new, an important issue relates to the rights
of students to access open campus areas—such as courtyards or sidewalks—
at public colleges and universities for speech and expressive activities. This
essay considers the continued reliance by some public higher education
institutions on designated free speech zones for purposes of containing
student speech and expressive activities, such as petition gathering or
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/campus-free-speech-trnd/index.html (discussing clashes
over controversial speakers at campuses throughout the United States).
2. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Calls for ‘Recommitment’ to Free Speech on Campus,
Diving into Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/
us/politics/jeff-sessions-campus-free-speech-georgetown.html (covering speech by Jeff
Sessions at Georgetown University Law Center on free speech in higher education).
3. Scott Jaschik, White Nationalists Rally at University of Virginia, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/08/14/white-nationalistsrally-university-virginia.
4. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Legal Grounds to Turn Away White Supremacist Speakers,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2017/08/17/public-universities-are-solid-ground-cancel-richard-spencer-events-legalexperts-say.
5. Taylor Gee, How the Middlebury Riot Really Went Down, POLITICO (May 28,
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/28/how-donald-trump-caused-themiddlebury-melee-215195.
6. Susan Svrluga, William Wan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, There Was No Ann Coulter
Speech. But Protestors Converged on Berkeley, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/27/theres-no-speech-planned-butprotesters-are-converging-on-berkeley-today/?utm_term=.d1dc063d10ec.
7. Madison Park & Kyung Lah, Berkeley Protests of Yiannopoulos Caused $100,000
in Damage, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017, 8:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/us/miloyiannopoulos-berkeley/index.html.
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leafletting, to particular campus locations.8 Public colleges and universities
have come under increasing legal scrutiny for reliance on speech zones and
have been subject to critiques that the use of speech zones conflicts with
institutional values related to the open exchange of ideas.
In the essay, the authors examine the permissibility of student speech
zones under the First Amendment. Related to this discussion, the essay also
considers recent state legislative efforts to prohibit public colleges and
universities from enforcing such campus speech zones. The authors are
supportive of legislative measures related to speech zones, but several
provisions in proposed state laws and model legislation go beyond this issue
and would potentially undercut student free speech rights and unduly
interfere with institutional autonomy to manage and respond to issues
involving speech and expression on campus. Instead, legislators should
exercise restraint when it comes to campus speech laws and not become
overly intrusive in how public colleges and universities manage and respond
to speech issues on campus, such as when disciplinary measures are
warranted for disruption of a campus speaker by a student or when campus
leaders make public comments on behalf of the institution in response to a
controversial issue on campus.
Before considering legal standards and debates related to the
(im)permissibility of speech zones for students in open campus areas, the
authors in Part I first discuss several factors that influence our positionality
in how we approach current debates, legal and otherwise, over free speech
issues in higher education. Next, Part II provides overall context regarding
key legal standards that courts have used to define student speech rights and
institutional authority in relation to open campus areas. As discussed in this
section, courts have often turned to forum analysis to provide the legal
standards applicable to open campus spaces and student speech. The section
considers how courts have not always been consistent regarding how to
define the type of forum at issue and the accompanying legal standards. As
covered in Part III, legal decisions reveal multiple courts are skeptical of
institutional speech regulations deemed overly restrictive as to student
speech in open campus areas. Part IV discusses how student speech cases
provide an additional legal lens to evaluate student speech rights in open
campus areas in addition to forum standards. Even as courts sort out college
students’ First Amendment rights to access open campus areas, as considered
in Part V, multiple states have moved to enact laws to prohibit them. In
conclusion, the final Part of the essay contends that trends against the use of
speech zones in relation to students represent a salutary development that
pushes institutions to live up to their intellectual commitments to students’
free speech. Even so, other trends, such as proposals to force public colleges

8. Speech zones can also be employed by public colleges and universities to regulate
the speech and expressive activities of individuals unaffiliated with the institution. This
essay focuses on the use of speech zones in relation to students.
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and universities to punish students who disrupt the speech of others, are too
intrusive on institutional autonomy.
I. SOME COMMENTS ON AUTHORS’ POSITIONALITY
An important point of contention in recent campus speech
controversies—which echoes in some respects an earlier period of legal
wrangling over campus speech codes and hate speech—involves the
principle that offensive or hurtful speech is often protected by the First
Amendment. Nevertheless, in current campus speech controversies, one line
of argument has arisen that colleges and universities should not have to
tolerate speakers who demean or espouse hatred of individuals or groups on
such bases as race or sexual orientation.9 In multiple instances, students have
advocated for such restrictions or sought to disrupt speakers when it comes
to campus access for some speakers.10 Some commentators have made light
of the argument that First Amendment speech rights should be weighed
against other concerns, such as cultivating welcoming campus climates that
foster student success and embrace multiculturalism.11 A popular response to
students challenging or disrupting speech they view as offensive has been to
label them as “snowflakes.”12 We reject this type of dismissive stance toward
students and others who have questioned free speech standards at colleges
and universities. Instead, our approach is to consider debates over campus
speech in the broader context of the multiple, and often competing, goals that
colleges and universities fulfill in society.13

9. See, e.g., Aaron R. Hanlon, Why Colleges Have a Right to Reject Hateful Speakers
Like Ann Coulter, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 24, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/
142218/colleges-right-reject-hateful-speakers-like-ann-coulter; See also K-Sue Park,
Opinion, The A.C.L.U. Needs to Rethink Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/opinion/aclu-first-amendment-trumpcharlottesville.html (articulates the view that generally, free speech concerns do not exist in
a vacuum but are influenced by overall social conditions and inequalities).
10. See, e.g., Caroline Glenn, When Does Protesting College Speakers Go Too Far?,
USA TODAY (May 13, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2017/05/13/when-does-protesting-college-speakers-go-too-far/321130001/; Nick Roll,
Blocking a President from Talking, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/09/speaker-interruptions-continuecontroversial-policy-adopted-wisconsin; Nick Roll, 2 More Campus Speakers Shouted
Down, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2017/10/12/speaker-protests-continue-options-punishments-unclear.
11. See, e.g., Robert Holland, Universities Invent New Devices to Stifle Speech and
Protect Snowflakes, THE HILL (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/education/326999-universities-invent-new-devices-to-stifle-speech-and-protectsnowflakes; Marc A. Thiessen, Millennials Are Snowflakes: Here’s the Data to Prove It,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/millennials-aresnowflakes-heres-data-prove-it-670662.
12. Id.
13. See generally CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (5th ed. 2001).
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First Amendment speech standards are largely based on the idea that
government does not pick and choose which ideas are superior.14 Keeping
channels of communication open allows for the testing of competing views
in the marketplace of ideas. However, serving as marketplaces for ideas—
marketplaces not based on concepts of quality control—represents only one
of the many purposes that colleges and universities serve in the United States.
Public higher education institutions are also committed to supporting
scholarly research and discourse that is evaluated on concepts of peer review
and adherence to particular disciplinary or methodological approaches. In
this type of intellectual discourse and inquiry, and in contrast to the need for
governmental neutrality toward a speaker’s message that is often important
in First Amendment speech contexts, scholarly speech is regularly subject to
quality assessments. For instance, when a professor is denied tenure based
on a failure to satisfy scholarly expectations, internal and external
assessments have typically been made regarding the scholarship’s value and
quality.15 As part of their missions, colleges and universities also seek to
further goals related to diversity and inclusion, as evidenced in mission
statements, mottos, and creeds that may be in opposition to certain ideas that
can be voiced by controversial speakers.
Some individuals and groups—such as the Goldwater Institute in
Arizona, which has weighed in on the issue of campus speech with model
legislation16—are uncomfortable with the idea that public colleges and
universities may be just as responsible for cultivating supportive climates for
racial and ethnic minority students as they are for being sites for speakers
who reflect the range of political discourse in a polarized, partisan society. A
provision in the Goldwater Institute’s model legislation calls upon
institutional leaders to be neutral on public controversies.17 Additionally,
rather than leaving autonomy with institutions to decide how to respond to
particular incidents, the organization’s model legislation would require
institutions to discipline protesters who disrupt campus speakers.18 We see
such countermeasures as a response to an exaggerated or manufactured
perception of throngs of protesters overtaking each of the thousands of
college campuses across the United States. The Foundation for Individual
14. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
15. Debates abound over tenure and the value of peer review. Our point in this
instance is not to wade into these conversations. Rather, we seek to point out that much
speech that takes place in higher education is subject to quality control standards—good or
bad—that are typically not a part of First Amendment analysis when it comes to assessment
of speech rights.
16. Stanley Kurtz, James Manley & Jonathan Butcher, Campus Free Speech: A
Legislative Proposal, GOLDWATER INST. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/cms_page_media/2017/2/2/X_Campus%20Free%20Speech%20Paper.pdf.
The model legislation from the Goldwater Institute, a think tank that advocates for
libertarian and conservative public policy positions, has been influential in the language
included in proposed and enacted state campus speech laws discussed in Part VI.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 20.
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Rights in Education (FIRE) recently surveyed a national sample of two- and
four-year college students. On one hand, they found that only a small
percentage of students stated that they might be willing to try to prevent
fellow students from attending a speech on campus or disrupt such an event.19
On the other hand, ninety-three percent (93%) of students in the survey
agreed that colleges should extend invitations to a variety of campus
speakers.20
Moving directly beyond the First Amendment student speech realm,
but still useful to show that threats to campus speech can have a politically
conservative bend, the governing board for the University of North Carolina
moved to prohibit the University of North Carolina School of Law’s Center
for Civil Rights from litigating cases to remedy civil rights injustices.21 Both
the Goldwater Institute model legislation and the action in North Carolina
illustrate efforts to curtail actions by public colleges and universities viewed
as overly partisan and left-leaning. From our perspective, some of the
critiques over student speech rights in higher education represent larger
efforts in some quarters to suppress perceived liberal predilections in higher
education, even if it means suppressing speech or academic freedom in
certain situations.
In terms of our own positionality, we are supportive of institutional
values related to diversity and inclusivity, but, at times, commitments in these
areas can come into tension with those related to free speech. Additionally,
colleges and universities must balance free speech concerns with other
considerations, such as costs incurred by controversial speakers and
maintaining the daily functions of the institution.22 Especially after events
such as the violence and unrest that occurred at the University of Virginia
following a gathering of white nationalists, an institution might seek to ban a
speaker on grounds that safety rights preclude being able to host the event.23
Indeed, some institutions, such as Texas A&M University, have moved to
block potential speakers who are viewed as a threat by many individuals on
campus.24 In addition, despite the importance of supporting speech and
19. Kelsey Ann Naughton, Speaking Freely: What Students Think about Expression at
American Colleges, FIRE (Oct. 2017), https://www.thefire.org/publications/student-attitudesfree-speech-survey/student-attitudes-free-speech-survey-full-text/.
20. Id.
21. Nick Roll, UNC Board Bars Litigation by Law School Center, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/11/north-carolina-boardbars-unc-center-civil-rights-litigating.
22. See, e.g., Suhauna Hussain, The Costs of the Campus Speech Wars Are Piling Up
for the Police, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 3, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article
/The-Costs-of-the-Campus-Speech/240527; Chris Quintana, What Berkeley’s $800,000
Did—and Didn’t—Buy During ‘Free Speech Week’, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC (Oct. 10,
2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/What-Berkeley-s-800000-Did/241419.
23. Peter Schmidt, Charlottesville Violence Sparks New Worries About Safety During
Campus Protests, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/
article/Charlottesville-Violence/240927.
24. See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 9.
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expression, colleges and universities must also prioritize their primary
functions of allowing students to safely attend classes. Thus, keeping in mind
that institutional expenditures are largely borne by taxpayers or student
tuition and fees, a relevant issue for consideration should be: What are
reasonable costs for institutions to absorb to ensure the safety of speakers,
attendees, and others on campus? Beyond cost, how much disruption must
an institution incur when it comes to speech and expressive activities that can
make it difficult for students to learn and for faculty and staff to do their jobs?
Increasingly, students and their parents bear large financial costs for tuition
and other expenses. Many students may not feel that they are paying or taking
on student loan debt to “give up” their campus for speech and expressive
activities that disrupt their attendance at classes or other aspects of the
collegiate experience. Such considerations may not trump constitutional
concerns, but they are not irrelevant to discussions of speech rights on
campus, and we do not view such concerns in a pejorative sense.
The aforementioned considerations do not negate an institution’s
legal or educative responsibilities to provide access to student speakers, but
allowing access to campus spaces for speech and expressive activities is only
one aspect of the multiple functions carried out at public colleges and
universities. When students or outside observers raise concerns about certain
campus speakers or types of speech, they create opportunities to examine and
seriously reflect upon their objections. The exercise of carefully asking how
a speaker may support the educational or scholarly mission of a college does
not mean that institutional leaders should automatically agree to censor or
prevent speakers from coming to campus. While the authors of this essay
may disagree that canceling or uninviting speakers is the best way to address
student, faculty, or citizen concerns, we reject the premise that concerns
about the negative impacts of hateful or hurtful speakers do not merit serious
intellectual engagement. Rather, concerns about speakers often raise issues
worthy of serious consideration and reflection about inequities that exist at
our higher education institutions and beyond.
II. FORUM STANDARDS AND OPEN CAMPUS AREAS
As with property under the control of other types of governmental
actors, forum standards often provide the determinative legal rules that
determine whether open areas on public college and university campuses
must be made available for student speech and expressive activities.25 Under
forum analysis, governmental property is subject to varying standards
regarding access for speech and expressive activities, depending on the

25. For a discussion of the use of forum analysis in higher education see Derek P.
Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing
Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481 (2005).
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property’s historical use or designated purpose by the government. 26 Under
forum standards, there exist (1) the traditional or designated public forum, 27
(2) a middle type of forum—sometimes referred to as a limited public
forum28—where use is limited to particular groups or for particular
purposes,29 and (3) the nonpublic forum.30
Many types of governmental property are not available for speech
and expressive activities by the general public.31 In contrast, some
governmental property, such as courtyards or sidewalks, are by tradition and
custom viewed as an open forum for citizen speech, constituting a traditional
public forum.32 Likewise, a governmental actor may voluntarily choose to
designate property it owns—the designated public forum—as a forum for
citizen speech functionally equivalent to a traditional public forum. Under
forum standards, a forum may also be reserved to a particular class of
individuals—such as students—and not to others—such as those unaffiliated
with an institution—or reserved for speech on particular issues.33
Additionally, the standards for governmental property may shift depending
on usage, such as when a public school allows community groups to use its
facilities when classes or other school activities are not in session.34 Thus, a
key step in forum analysis involves classifying the type of forum under
consideration and the operable First Amendment standards for the forum type
in relation to students or others seeking access to the forum.
When an open campus area is classified as a traditional or designated
public forum, colleges and universities are limited in the extent to which they
can control access to, or impose regulations on, that space, which can also

26. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
27. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“[M]embers of the
public retain strong free speech rights when they venture into public streets and parks. . . . “).
28. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (citing
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Courts have
not always been consistent in naming or describing this middle forum.
29. See generally Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33
NOVA L. REV. 299 (2009). In the case of public colleges and universities, for instance, as
developed in this essay, language in some opinions can be taken to suggest that public
colleges and universities can limit certain open forums to students but then must apply the
legal standards typically associated with the traditional or designated public forum.
30. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on
the basis of the subject matter and speaker identity.”).
31. Id. at 46 (holding that school mail facilities constituted a nonpublic forum).
32. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 469.
33. Id. at 470.
34. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (involving a
school district policy that governed the use of school facilities by the general public—
resulting in a limited public forum—when not being used for school purposes).
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reach individuals unaffiliated with the institution.35 As raised in this essay, a
question exists whether a traditional or designated public forum may exist
only in relation to students and not for speakers unaffiliated with the
institution.36 Typically, if a forum is not open to all members of the general
public, then it falls into the middle category of fora—the limited public
forum.37 However, in several legal decisions, courts have expressed
skepticism about whether public colleges or universities may regulate student
speech by categorizing all or most open campus areas as limited or nonpublic
fora in relation to students.38 The extent of institutional legal authority over
student speech in open campus areas has important implications when it
comes to student speech zones. Namely, does a public college or university
possess legal discretion to restrict student speech and expression to specific
“speech zones” in outdoor areas on campus? To begin to address this
question, this section provides an overview of First Amendment standards
generally applicable to college student speech before turning specifically in
Part III to speech zones and open campus areas.
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have established that
public college and university students possess important speech rights in
relation to their institutions.39 These decisions mandate that public college
students do not forfeit their First Amendment rights in exchange for
admission. At the same time, the extent of available student speech rights in
public higher education depends on several factors. Along with the context
in which the speech arises—i.e., traditional, designated, or nonpublic
forum—the nature of the speech can also implicate institutional authority.40
In terms of context, courts have recognized, for instance, that colleges and
universities possess greater legal discretion to regulate student speech that
arises in class settings, whether residential or online.41 Institutions may
regulate student speech that implicates educator authority, even if the speech
35. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 469-70 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)) (“Government restrictions on speech in a
designated public forum are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional
public forum.”).
36. As developed in this essay in Part IV, judicial discussion of traditional and
designated public fora would not seem to suggest exclusion to particular groups such as
students. However, as illustrated by language in opinions discussed in this essay, at least
some courts seem to indicate that the legal standards applicable to these types of fora could
be used in applying to open campus fora that are limited to students.
37. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681
(2010) (discussing the use of limited public forum analysis in the context of colleges and
universities limiting official recognition of student organizations to those groups only
limited to student members).
38. See infra Part IV.
39. For a discussion of First Amendment rights available to college students, see
Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens & James D. Breslin, A (Virtual) Land of Confusion with
College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 49 (2013).
40. Id. at 53-71.
41. Id. at 65-71.
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does not take place in instructional settings (such as on the basis of
professionalism standards as might be present in a student-teacher education
program).42 In contrast to student speech arising in class contexts, public
colleges and universities tend to possess less control over student speech that
occurs in non-class related situations. No matter the setting in which the
speech takes place, public college and university officials are also able to
restrict speech and discipline students for speech that represents a true threat
to others43 or otherwise meets the standards of harassment under relevant
laws such as Title IX44 or Title VI.45
In the context of campus fora, in Widmar v. Vincent,46 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that when a campus forum has been made available to
students, the institution must not favor or disfavor particular viewpoints in
providing access to the forum.47 Additionally, the Court’s opinion in this case
noted that, in many respects, campus areas are akin to traditional open fora
as it relates to students.48 Still, the Court stated in Widmar that a college
campus “differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or
parks or even municipal theaters.”49 As such, according to the Court, public
higher education institutions retain discretion to “impose reasonable
regulations compatible with that [educational] mission upon the use of its
campus and facilities.”50 Additionally, a public college or university operates
under no legal obligation to “make all of its facilities equally available to
students and non-students alike, or that a university must grant free access to
all of its grounds or buildings.”51
In relation to forum determinations with open campus areas and
students, within either a traditional or designated public forum, governmental
restrictions on the content of speech must survive strict scrutiny.52 As long as
42. See generally Neal H. Hutchens & Mercy Roberg, Professionalism Standards and
College Students’ First Amendment Speech Rights, 342 ED. LAW REP. 16 (2017).
43. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (per curiam)) (explaining, “‘True threats’” encompass those statements where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”).
44. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
45. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
46. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
47. Id. at 277; See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Supreme
Court rejected the position that the alternative of a group of students to meet off campus
supported a conclusion that no deprivation of First Amendment rights had occurred. Id. at
182-83. While affirming students’ First Amendment rights on campus, the Court also
discussed that institutions could restrict speech and expressive activities that “infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education.” Id. at 189.
48. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund & Educ. Fund, 473 US. 788, 800 (citing
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“[S]peakers can
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a restriction is content neutral, a governmental actor my impose reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations.53 Such restrictions, however, must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and must leave
open ample alternative channels for communication.54 Under time, place, and
manner standards, the government may, for instance, restrict the use of sound
amplification devices, because such a restriction bears no relation to the
content of the speech involved.55
As discussed, courts have recognized a category of fora between the
traditional/designated forum and the nonpublic forum. However, they have
not always demonstrated consensus over how exactly to characterize this
type of middle forum—we use the term “limited public forum.”56 With a
limited public forum, the government may open a space to certain groups, or
for specific types of speech or expressive activities.57 With a limited public
forum, restrictions must be reasonable in relation to the forum’s purpose, and
the government must not engage in viewpoint discrimination in the treatment
of those otherwise permitted to access the forum. 58 For instance, if a public
college or university has created a forum for student political groups, then it
cannot favor or disfavor one group over another on the basis of espoused
political beliefs.
A classroom demonstrates the concept of a nonpublic forum in the
context of student speech. In a nonpublic forum, governmental authority to
regulate speech is substantially greater than it would be in a traditional or
designated public forum. To illustrate, in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, a college
theater major claimed that her First Amendment rights were violated when
instructors refused her request to refrain from reciting certain words or
phrases in classroom acting exercises that she found objectionable on
religious grounds.59 In its analysis, the Court stated that it first needed to
determine what kind of forum the classroom constituted.60 While the
student’s speech claim also depended upon the fact that the speech directly
involved an instructional activity,61 the classroom’s designation as a
be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”).
53. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
54. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984) (upholding
National Park Service regulation that prohibited sleeping overnight in LaFayette Park near
the White House and the National Mall as applied to a demonstration to raise awareness of
homelessness).
55. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
56. See generally Rohr, supra note 29 at 322; see also Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d
466, 474 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing how courts have used the terms “‘limited designated
public forum’ (versus the ‘true forum’), the ‘limited public forum,’ or the ‘limited forum’”).
57. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
58. Id. at 106-07 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund & Educ. Fund, 473 US.
788, 806 (1985)).
59. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
60. Id. at 1284-86.
61. See infra Part IV.
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nonpublic forum supported institutional authority to require the student to
recite all the words in an assignment. The Court concluded that no basis
existed to conclude that the classroom constituted a traditional or designated
public forum, or whether heightened speech protections would apply.62 As a
nonpublic forum, the institution “could regulate the speech that takes place
there [the classroom] ‘in any reasonable manner.’”63
Multiple fora can exist on public college and university campuses.
These can range from nonpublic fora, such as classrooms (at least when
classes are in session), to limited and traditional/designated public fora.
Additionally, depending on its usage at a particular time, a campus space can
take the form of more than one type of forum. For instance, an auditorium
might be used for performances (a nonpublic forum) but then also be made
available when not in use for university functions to be reserved by student
groups or members of the general public (a designated or limited public
forum). Legal disputes may arise regarding access by students to otherwise
seemingly “public” spaces on campus, especially those typically found to be
traditional public fora outside of the university context, such as sidewalks or
courtyards. Litigation often centers on the extent to which institutions may
control these open campus areas in relation to students. In the next section,
we focus on the legal authority of public colleges and universities to treat
specific campus areas as designated free speech zones for students, while
seeking to classify most other campus areas as either a nonpublic or limited
public forum for student speech.
III. STUDENTS, OPEN CAMPUS AREAS, AND SPEECH ZONES
As shown in the discussion in this section, multiple courts have
resisted institutional free-speech zone policies that they deem as overly
restrictive when it comes to student speech. At the same time, even among
cases in which courts have been dubious of institutional authority to enforce
speech zones, important questions remain unresolved. To what extent must
an institution provide students access to open campus areas? Furthermore, if
a forum is limited to students, what kind of forum is created exactly? Is the
resulting forum a type of traditional/designated forum, despite the fact that it
is limited to students? Or is the resulting forum a limited public forum that is
subject to standards of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality when it
comes to limits on institutional authority?
A case involving the University of Cincinnati64 illustrates how a
court may not favorably view speech zone policies that limit student speech
and expression to small areas on public campuses. Students at the university
sought to collect signatures for a petition drive to have a labor-related
62. 356 F.3d at 1285.
63. Id. (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988)).
64. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV155, 2012 WL 2160969 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012).
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measure placed on the ballot for an upcoming state election.65 The students
encountered university rules that limited demonstrations, picketing, and
rallies to a free speech zone that comprised a small part (0.01 percent) of
campus.66 The students also alleged that the university enforced a policy that
meant any speakers had to provide a minimum of a five-day notice to be able
to engage in any speech or expressive activity.67
Legal arguments in the case centered on forum analyses for the
various open campus areas that students sought to access. Students contended
that the free speech zone constituted a traditional public forum and that other
open areas at which they sought to gather petitions were designated public
fora in relation to students.68 The university countered that all the open
campus spaces in question were limited public fora, which meant any
institutional regulations would be evaluated based on standards of
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.69
In analyzing the fora at issue, the Court discussed that forum
classifications depend on factors that include “the traditional use of the
property, the objective use and purposes of the space, the government intent
and policy with respect to the property, and its physical characteristics and
location.”70 In determining how to classify the speech zone, the Court
distinguished between the university’s “subjective” intent to restrict access
versus its adoption of “objective criteria [that] demonstrate[d] that the
University ha[d] traditionally made the Free Speech Area available to
students as a designated public forum.”71 The Court noted that the university
also characterized the space as the “main free speech area” to which it had
allowed demonstrations, rallies, and pickets even while disallowing such
activities in other areas.72 According to the Court, the university had, “as a
matter of course,” made the free speech area available for student speech and
expressive activity.73 Based on these considerations, the Court classified the
free speech area as a designated public forum.74 Furthermore, the Court also
decided that other campus areas under consideration, such as interior
sidewalks, also constituted designated public fora, at least for students.75
An important point to consider in the case involves the fact that the
Court interpreted all the fora in question as designated public fora. The Court
did not analyze the students’ argument that the free speech zone constituted
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(1985)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund & Educ. Fund, 473 US. 788, 802
Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
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a type of traditional public forum, at least in relation to students.76 The
significance of this issue relates to the fact that the government retains
ultimate authority to re-classify a designated public forum. While many
institutions may be unlikely to re-categorize a forum open for student
expression based on pushback from students, this is not necessarily always
the case. For example, Ohio University, in the wake of multiple protests,
moved to establish, with an interim policy, that indoor spaces previously
available for student speech and expressive activity were no longer an open
forum.77 The incident illustrates that a relevant question in the student speech
realm involves the extent to which public institutions retain legal control to
limit student speech by re-classifying open campus areas as limited or
nonpublic fora.
In Williams, the Court did offer in dicta some views about the limits
of institutional authority to regulate student speech. It described the
University of Cincinnati’s assertion to control student speech in open campus
spaces as “anathema to the nature of a university” and to the idea of higher
education institutions serving as a marketplace for ideas.78 Additionally, the
Court stated that it was unaware of any previous legal decisions holding that
a public college or university “may constitutionally designate its entire
campus as a limited public forum as applied to students.”79 The Court,
however, did not elaborate upon this idea and what limits might exist under
the First Amendment about how a college or university may choose to
classify open campus spaces when it comes to student speech and expression
and overall access to such areas.
Other courts have shown skepticism over institutional policies
viewed as overly restrictive of student speech in open campus spaces. For
example, a federal appeals court held that multiple open campus areas at the
University of Texas at Austin constituted designated public fora in relation
to students.80 The University had contended that these areas should be
interpreted as either limited or nonpublic fora.81 The University further
argued that if the campus areas were categorized as designated public fora,
then the spaces in question would have to be open to individuals unaffiliated
with the institution along with students.82 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive, stating that its task was “simply to determine whether outdoor
open areas of the University campus, accessible to students generally, have
been designated as a forum for student expression.”83 Looking to institutional
76. Id.
77. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Total Prohibition, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/13/ohio-universitys-new-free-expressionpolicy-bars-indoor-protests.
78. Williams, 2012 WL 2160969, at *5.
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F. 3d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2005).
81. Id. at 766.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 767 (emphasis in original).
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rules and statements, the Court stated that the institution had granted
“students too broad a guarantee of expressive freedom now to claim it
intended its campus to function as a limited public forum.”84 Applying the
standards applicable to a designated public forum, the Court invalidated the
University of Texas’ prohibition on anonymous leafletting in open campus
spaces as an unreasonable regulation.85
In other cases, courts have also emphasized institutional policy as a
basis to invalidate efforts to constrain student speech activities. For example,
in a case involving the University of Houston,86 a federal district court
decided that the University, based on past policy and practice, had
“purposefully opened” a campus plaza for student speech and expression
over a period of years.87 After a dispute over the use of the plaza, the
University sought to re-classify it as a limited public forum or nonpublic
forum instead of a designated public forum. 88 The Court rejected the
institution’s arguments that the change in policy rendered the students’ First
Amendment arguments moot.89 However, in not allowing such a reclassification to serve as a basis to make the students’ claims moot, the Court
did not elaborate upon the circumstances in which a public college or
university could permissibly re-classify fora that it had previously made
available to students.
The cases involving the University of Cincinnati, University of
Texas at Austin, and the University of Houston illustrate how courts have
interpreted institutional policy in ways that are sympathetic to student speech
rights in open campus areas. Even though the cases raised the topic of
institutional authority to determine forum standards, the courts did little to
address potential limits on the authority of colleges and universities to
categorize or re-categorize open campus areas in terms of forum standards.
This is not an abstract discussion, as some public colleges and universities
continue to enforce speech zones that restrict campus speech and expression
to relatively small areas on campus.
One exception to an overall lack of explicit judicial consideration of
the issue comes from a case involving Texas Tech University.90 In the
decision, a federal district court speculated on whether public higher
education institutions must treat at least some campus areas as a type of open
forum in terms of students. The Court pointed to two “axioms” relevant to its
inquiry.91 First, an entire university campus does not constitute some sort of

84. Id. at 769.
85. Id. at 771.
86. Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
87. Id. at 582.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 581 (rejecting such arguments in part because the university continued to
defend the constitutionality of the original policy).
90. Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Texas 2004).
91. Id. at 861.
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public forum.92 Second, the Court noted that previous decisions recognized
that a public college or university campus has many characteristics of a
public forum, at least when it comes to students.93 Keeping both these
directives in mind, the Court offered the “preliminary assumption” that “to
the extent the campus has park areas, sidewalks, streets, or other similar
common areas, these areas are public forums, at least for the University’s
students, irrespective of whether the University has so designated them or
not.”94 Having determined that at least some, but not all, open campus spaces
constituted open fora in terms of students, the Court stated that the University
could designate more spaces as open fora, but it could not go below this idea
of some kind of a minimum—though the Court did not clarify exactly how
such a determination is made.95
Despite not offering specific criteria to determine how much of a
campus must be open to students, the Court did offer some thoughts on a
rationale for finding certain open campus areas as open fora for students. The
Court discussed how design factors in with similarities to traditional public
fora such as parks and sidewalks could be taken into consideration when
making forum determinations as to students.96 The language suggests that for
students, the campus environment can be viewed in certain respects as a
microcosm of the larger society.
In this special societal subset, students can be viewed to constitute
the citizenry, with certain campus fora available to them just as would be the
case for the general public in other settings in terms of access to
governmental property. Such an approach is not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s observation in Widmar v. Vincent that “the campus of a
public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum.”97 Along these lines, in a case involving the
University of Nevada at Las Vegas, the Nevada Supreme Court discussed
that “when reviewing restrictions placed on students’ speech activities, courts
have found university campuses to be designated public forums. However,
when the rights being restricted belong to nonstudents, courts have generally
held university facilities and campuses to be limited public or nonpublic
forums.”98
While not fully articulated, it may well be that future court decisions
could outline a special category of forum analysis relative to students and
their institutions. It is not unprecedented for the Supreme Court to adjust First
Amendment rules to a collegiate environment. In Board of Regents of the
92. Id. (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983)).
93. Id. at 861 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981)).
94. Id. at 861.
95. Id. at 862.
96. Id. at 861 n.8.
97. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
98. Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t., 100 P.3d 179,
190 (Nev. 2004) (holding that, at least to nonstudents, the UNLV campus constituted a
limited public forum).
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University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,99 the Court held that public
colleges and universities may impose mandatory student fees that can be used
to support the activities of recognized student organizations.100 In
Southworth, a group of students challenged the fees as a form of
impermissible compelled speech.101 The students argued that the situation
facing them was equivalent to instances where the Supreme Court had
invalidated using membership fees to a teacher’s union and a state bar
association—organizations to which the objectors had to belong based on
their professional positions—to fund political speech not germane to the
principal functions of the organizations.102 The Supreme Court rejected the
students’ argument in Southworth.103
Determining that a germaneness test would prove unworkable in a
collegiate setting, the Court offered the following:
If it is difficult to define germane speech with ease or
precision where a union or bar association is the party, the
standard becomes all the more unmanageable in the public
university setting, particularly where the State undertakes to
stimulate the whole universe of speech and ideas.104
Considering the intellectual purposes of a public university, the
Court determined that an institution could implement a mandatory fee
program to support student organizations.105 Specifically, it turned to the
standards applicable to the limited public forum—viewpoint neutrality and
reasonableness—to evaluate the distribution of funding under a mandatory
student fee structure.106
Thus, the case presents an example of the Supreme Court calibrating
First Amendment standards in a manner appropriate to students and a public
higher education environment. To avoid confusion, we are not suggesting
that Southworth stands for the proposition that all open campus areas should
be viewed as a limited public forum in relation to students. A public college
or university does not have to maintain a mandatory student fee program for
the support of student organizations. It is also worth noting that access to
open campus areas for students would not need to be predicated on receiving
recognition as an official student organization. Our point in discussing
Southworth is to demonstrate how the Supreme Court has differentiated First
Amendment standards dealing with student speech from other First
Amendment speech cases not involving higher education.
99. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
100. Id. at 233.
101. Id. at 227.
102. Id. at 230.
103. Id. at 232.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 233.
106. Id.
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While language in some court opinions suggests that
traditional/designated public fora rules may be the appropriate standards to
apply to student speech in various open campus spaces, not all courts have
been sympathetic to student claims regarding such campus areas. In a case
involving a student organization at the University of South Alabama,107
students sought to distribute flyers and engage in “peaceful demonstrations”
at various outdoor places on campus.108 Initially, the University limited
student speech and expressive activity to a free speech zone near the student
center.109 During litigation, the institution revised its standards to expand the
available spaces.110 The students still sought access to an area referred to as
the “Perimeter,” which included “most spaces between the street side of
campus buildings and the public sidewalks paralleling [two streets through
campus].”111 The Court rejected the assertion that the space in question
should be viewed as a traditional public forum.112 While accepting the
proposition that it is “theoretically” possible that the Perimeter constituted a
designated public forum for students and a limited public forum for those
unaffiliated with the University,113 the Court determined that the institution
had made clear determinations in policy and practice that the Perimeter did
not constitute an open forum for student speech and expressive activity.114
While several courts have offered views suggesting that students are
vested with First Amendment speech rights for at least some open campus
areas that operate independent of institutional mandates, such a conclusion is
far from certain. At most, courts may be willing to afford public colleges and
universities limited leeway in interpreting student speech policies for open
campus areas in a narrow manner. As perhaps indicated with the case
involving the University of South Alabama, an institution’s clear expression
of policy backed by practice that aligns with the official policy may mean
that public colleges and universities enjoy considerable discretion when it
comes to regulating student speech in open campus areas. Conversely, as
litigation continues, courts may begin to articulate clearer limits on
institutional authority to restrict student speech in open campus spaces. One
potential avenue is the recognition of campus fora for students that are a
special subset of the traditional public forum or, alternatively, even if not

107. Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (S.D. Ala. 2016).
108. Id. at 1219.
109. Id. at 1220.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1223.
113. Id. at 1224.
114. Id. at 1230. Alongside a clear policy statement, the court discussed that the
students failed to demonstrate that the university had engaged in sufficient practices related
to the Perimeter that resulted in the creation of a designated public forum. Id. at 1229.
According to the Court, the students “failed to show a consistent or even sporadic practice
by the University of authorizing, contrary to its formal policy, indiscriminate use of the
Perimeter for general student discourse.” Id. at 1225.
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labeled as such, that function under the same legal standards as applied to
traditional and designated public fora. The next section considers other
alternatives to establish student speech rights in open campus areas. Besides
limiting analysis to cases centered on forum standards, courts could also
apply legal rules from other lines of precedent involving student speech in
determining the extent of college student speech rights in open spaces on
campus.
IV. BEYOND FORUM ANALYSIS
With student speech rights, apart from forum analysis, other First
Amendment protections for student speech are relevant, especially in relation
to the use of speech zones and restrictions on certain expressive activities,
such as handing out flyers. As noted in Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme
Court discussed that, when it comes to students, a college or university
campus in many respects resembles open fora as are found in the context of
other governmental property.115 Beyond forum analysis, cases such as
Widmar—and Healy v. James116—also demonstrate the Supreme Court
making clear that First Amendment speech protections apply to public
college students. Outside of a forum analysis, are there other speech
protections—whether grounded in concepts of student academic freedom or
from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District117—that
should apply to college students’ speech claims made pursuant to speech and
expressive activities in open campus areas?
At times, commentators have referred to the concept of students’
academic freedom rights.118 The American Association of University
Professors endorses the concept of student free speech and inquiry as a
fundamental aspect of higher education.119 Courts have also demonstrated
interest in the issue of student speech rights as members of the campus
community. In Oyama v. University of Hawaii,120 for example, a student,
dismissed from a teacher education program based on comments and actions
that led faculty to conclude he was unfit for student teaching, challenged the
dismissal.121 This decision left him unable to qualify for professional
115. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
116. 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that student group could not be denied access to
meet on campus).
117. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Tinker case is discussed later in this section.
118. For consideration of the issue, see Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, A
Close-Up, Modern Look at First Amendment Academic Freedom Rights of Public College
Students and Faculty, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2017).
119. Academic Freedom of Students and Professors, and Political Discrimination, AM.
ASS’N. U. PROFESSORS, https://www.aaup.org/academic-freedom-students-and-professorsand-political-discrimination (discussing that the notion students possess legally cognizable
academic freedom rights represents a contested issue).
120. 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015).
121. Id. at 855. For example, the student, Oyama, asserted in a paper that consensual
sex with a minor should not be illegal. Id. at 856. When questioned by a faculty member, he
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licensure as a teacher.122 Based on his rejection from student teaching and
unable to reach a compromise with the University, Oyama challenged the
actions taken against him as an infringement of his First Amendment
rights.123 A federal district court held that the standards announced by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir124 provided
an acceptable legal basis to exclude Oyama from student teaching.125 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
against Oyama, but it based its decision on legal standards other than
Kuhlmeir. The Court described the First Amendment situation under review
as of a “hybrid nature,” comingling “characteristics of both a student and a
public employee.”126 For our purposes, the significant point arises from the
Court’s refusal to look exclusively to either of these lines of precedent.
Namely, the Court discussed how neither grouping of cases failed to account
for the academic freedom concerns present in higher education.127
A case such as Oyama raises questions over how First Amendment
analysis should take into account student speech rights in a curricular-related
context, but such concerns are also present in the cases involving student
speech in open campus areas. In particular, how are student speech cases,
notably Tinker, potentially implicated in relation to the use of student speech
zones?128 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that a high school could not
prohibit students from wearing black armbands as a form of silent protest to
the Vietnam War.129 The Court discussed that absent a substantial disruption
to the educational environment or speech that constituted an impediment on
the educational rights of other students, independent student speech is
protected by the First Amendment.130
In considering the applicability of student speech cases—Tinker in
particular—in relation to student speech zones, an important point to keep in
mind is the need to calibrate the standards of substantial disruption or
impeding the educational rights of other students to a collegiate environment.
Some commentators—rightly in our view—have criticized courts for the
stated that he would uphold state legal requirements but did not recant this position. Id.
Oyama also made comments concerning students with disabilities that alarmed educators. Id.
at 856-57.
122. Id. at 854.
123. Id. at 859.
124. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In the case, a secondary school newspaper was censored by
the principal. Id. at 263-64. The Supreme Court held that because the newspaper was
connected to a journalism class and involved student speech that is school-sponsored in
nature, it could be censored without violating the First Amendment. Id. at 274.
125. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 859-60.
126. Id. at 860.
127. Id. at 863, 866.
128. A “hat tip” goes to Lee Tyner, former general counsel at the University of
Mississippi, for a conversation on the lack of a coherency in terms of the student speech line
of cases and application of forum standards in addressing student speech claims.
129. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
130. Id. at 513.
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importation of these standards—especially Kuhlmeir—without making the
necessary adjustments for their application to college students.131 With the
issue of student speech in open campus areas, however, the Kuhlmeir
standards are well removed from any kind of notion of school-sponsored
speech. In fact, with the concept of forum analysis, the point is that, even
though the speech is taking place on government property, it is not
governmental speech at issue. Rather, such fora are intended as places of
independent citizen speech, which would encompass student speech in open
campus areas. Accordingly, the type of independent student speech at issue
in Tinker is more relevant to student speech in open campus spaces.
If a court were to appropriately tailor Tinker-esque standards to
collegiate speech, what would this mean for open campus areas? That is,
should the speech rights available to public college and university students—
especially if influenced by concepts related to student academic freedom—
also inform the ways in which courts interpret student speech rights? If so,
this could influence the extent to which an institution could, for example,
declare all or most of the campus a limited or nonpublic forum in relation to
open campus areas and then relegate student speech to small speech zones. It
could also impact, apart from speech zone usage by groups of students,
whether an individual student or small group of students seeking signatures
for a petition or handing out flyers would result in the type of substantial
disruption that would be subject to institutional authority.
Thus, along with forum standards, courts could consider what
baseline speech rights should be possessed by public college students in open
campus spaces independent of the concept of forum analysis. Doing so would
create some interpretational challenges—especially given struggles by some
courts over not treating college students like their elementary and secondary
peers for First Amendment purposes—but it could help solve others as well.
Looking to Tinker concepts could provide a basis to evaluate the level of
access that is appropriate for students to open campus areas apart from or
along with forum standards. For instance, even if open campus areas reserved
for students are interpreted as a limited public forum—as opposed to a
traditional/designated public forum—these standards could prove helpful in
relation to determining what constitutes a reasonable restriction on college
students’ speech in such a forum. Furthermore, even as to open campus areas
labeled as a nonpublic forum, these standards could provide a basis to
prohibit restrictions on at least certain types of student speech, such as
petition gathering or leafletting. If applied in a way suitable to public college
students, Tinker and other student speech cases provide a basis to take into
account the speech rights that should accrue to students—independent of

131. See, e.g., Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship
Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305 (2013); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801 (2017);
Sun et al., supra note 39.
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forum analysis—based on their status as members of an academic
community.
V. STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO RE-SHAPE STUDENT AND
INSTITUTIONAL SPEECH RIGHTS
Even as courts consider the permissibility of student speech zones
under the First Amendment, some states have moved to prohibit their use at
public institutions. Along with addressing speech zones, provisions in state
laws or in proposed legislation have sought to regulate other facets of
individual campus speech rights, such as mandating disciplinary measures
against students who disrupt a campus speaker. Model legislation from the
Goldwater Institute that has provided a pattern for state legislative proposals
also contains provisions that pertain to institutionally-based speech. In
particular, the model legislation calls for institutional leaders to take a neutral
stance on matters of public controversy. This section considers recently
enacted state laws and proposed legislative measures dealing with
individuals speech rights on campus and institutional responsibilities and
roles in matters of free speech and expression.
At least eight states—Arizona,132 Colorado,133 Kentucky,134
Missouri,135 North Carolina,136 Tennessee,137 Virginia,138 and Utah139— have
enacted laws that, among their provisions, address the use of student speech
zones. Virginia’s law, enacted in 2014, illustrates the types of provisions
found in these statutes:
Public institutions of higher education shall not impose
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of student speech
that (i) occurs in the outdoor areas of the institution’s
campus and (ii) is protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution unless the restrictions (a) are
reasonable, (b) are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, (c) are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and (d) leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the
information.140

132. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1864 (2017).
133. COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-5-144 (2017).
134. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.183 (West 2017).
135. MO. REV. STAT. § 173.1550 (2017).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-300 (2017).
137. 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 336.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-401 (West 2017).
139. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53b-27-201 (West 2017).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-401 (West 2017).
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Under the Virginia standards, and those in other state laws,
institutions must abide by the First Amendment rules governing
traditional/designated public fora in terms of regulating student speech in
open campus areas.
For supporters of student speech rights, these laws represent a
welcome development in making public college campuses open and
accessible for student speech and expression. Other states are likely to
continue weighing the enactment of similar laws. Alongside resistance by
multiple courts, legislative trends against speech zones in these laws suggest
that institutions still legally permitted to use student speech zones should
reflect on their appropriateness for a collegiate environment. That is, apart
from legal mandates, institutions’ use of speech zones runs contrary to the
concept of colleges and universities as places for the free exchange of ideas.
Whether public or private, institutional leaders should consider carefully the
value of speech zones in terms of adhering to institutional prerogatives in the
area of free speech and the open exchange of ideas. Such contemplation could
lead institutions to conclude that speech zones, even if not subject to an active
legal challenge or state legal provision, are at odds with values of free inquiry
espoused by most colleges and universities.
While state laws that ban speech zones represent a useful
development in the student speech realm in our view, other statutory
provisions have been considered in state campus speech bills that, under the
guise of free speech, are problematic in furthering the goals of intellectual
inquiry on campus. Several of these provisions are more focused on
furthering a narrative that colleges and universities are antagonistic to free
speech—at least of those individuals from the political right—and, thus,
require that state legislatures should mandate heavily prescriptive rules for
how public colleges and universities deal with speech controversies on
campus. These proposed rules go much further than guaranteeing access to
open campus areas for students. In particular, some provisions seek to
mandate that institutions must punish students who disrupt the speech of
others.
While enacted in a diluted form in terms of imposing specific
requirements on institutions, North Carolina passed a campus speech law that
requires public institutions to have policies in place that address the issue of
student discipline for the disruption of speakers.141 Proposed legislation
seems to have prompted the governing board of the University of Wisconsin
to adopt a policy aimed at students who interfere with campus speakers.142
141. Matthew Burn, UNC Official OK with Revised ‘Free Speech’ Bill, WRAL.COM
(Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.wral.com/unc-officials-ok-with-revised-free-speechbill/16662870/.
142. Karen Herzog, Regents Approve Punishments up to Expulsion for UW Students
Who Repeatedly Disrupt Speakers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 6, 2017),
http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/education/2017/10/06/regents-consider-punishmentsuw-students-who-disrupt-speakers/738438001/.

126

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5: 103

Under the policy, a student who has twice previously disrupted a speaker is
subject to suspension for a third offense.143 Such a requirement leaves
university officials having to enforce an overly cumbersome rule for when
punishment should or should not occur for opposing a campus speaker. In
fact, free speech could be chilled by students refraining from speech and
expressive activity based on fear of punishment.
Furthermore, disruption provisions may actually infringe on
students’ First Amendment rights based on the difficulty in crafting standards
that are not vague and do not encroach on speech and expressive activity that
is protected by the First Amendment. Based on such concerns, the
Foundational for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)—an influential
group that has promoted student free speech in higher education—came out
against this type of requirement in the Wisconsin bill that preceded the
University of Wisconsin policy.144 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) also expressed concern over the requirement originally considered
in the North Carolina legislation to punish those who disrupt speakers.145 As
noted earlier, speaker disruption provisions can be traced to language in
model legislation from the Goldwater Institute discussed earlier in the
essay.146
Forcing colleges and universities to take punitive action against all
types of disruption of speakers takes away needed discretion for colleges and
universities to be able to carry out their educational mission. It also creates
difficulty in enforcement, as it places a heavy burden on institutions to define
what constitutes a disruption and then to identify disruptors. A better
approach is to let institutions make decisions on a case-by-case basis for
when punishment is warranted, such as when disruptions present a threat to
public safety. Rather than fixate on punitive enforcement, colleges and
universities should instead focus on ways to promote an exchange of ideas in
which individuals are able to disagree with, but also abide, speech that they
find objectionable.
Another provision in the Goldwater Institute model legislation calls
for institutions to assume a neutral stance on issue of public controversy.147
In essence, the legislation proposes to muzzle institutional leaders on various
speech issues to weaken the notion that institutions are able to espouse values
related to, for instance, diversity and inclusion. Apart from concerns over
misunderstanding the place of colleges as appropriately being able to
advocate for certain positions, this kind of legislation would prove
143. Id.
144. Colleen Flaherty, Words Fly on Free Speech Bill, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 15,
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/15/critics-proposed-legislation-firstamendment-rights-wisconsin-public-universities.
145. Ray Gronberg, Rights Group Has Qualms about ‘Free Speech’ Bill Targeting
UNC, HERALD SUN (May 4, 2017), http://www.heraldsun.com/news/local/education/
article148662214.html.
146. Kurtz, et al., supra note 16.
147. Id. at 20.
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exceptionally difficult to implement. Namely, under what circumstances
exactly would a subject exactly qualify as controversial? For example, there
are many individuals now dubious of college football based on, among other
things, the physical threats to players, including risk for traumatic brain
injuries. As such, would that mean that a public college or university
president would be forced to refrain from commenting in an official capacity
on an upcoming football game? On most any conceivable topic, there may
exist some level of controversy. Seeking to force public higher education
institutions to remain neutral is not realistic given the array of issues arising
on college campuses.
The model legislation aims to correct what the organization views as
too much of a left-leaning bias in American higher education and promote a
narrative that the only threats to free speech on college campuses come from
the political left.148 In our view, the speaker disruption and neutrality
provisions are best viewed as using free speech as intellectual cover to
undermine institutional autonomy rather than just reflective of concerns over
free speech. Echoing such a stance, consider the speech by Attorney General
Jeff Sessions at Georgetown University Law Center where he derided the
current status of free expression on campus.149 It would be interesting to
discover when Sessions became a free speech “warrior.” As the Attorney
General of Alabama, Sessions sought to prevent a LGBTQ-focused
conference at the University of Alabama.150
In a similar vein, the Goldwater Institute model legislation uses free
speech as camouflage for efforts to further a particular ideological vision of
higher education and society. In some ways, critics of free speech from the
political left have been more transparent in offering the view that free speech
concerns are secondary to other interests. It is important to keep in mind that
campus speech debates are encompassed in larger societal and political
debates surrounding higher education, with potential intrusions of free
speech capable of coming from the political right as well as the political left.
CONCLUSION
The defining free speech issues of the summer of 2017 related to
issues of religion and racism. Some want colleges and universities to ensure
students’ rights to engage in a wide range of speech, including that which is
demeaning toward particular individuals and groups in society. Others
defend institutional leaders’ decisions to block hate speech and students’
148. Id.
149. Ruiz, supra note 2.
150. Mark Joseph Stern, Sessions the Censor, SLATE (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/10/jeff_sessions_tried_to_stop_lgbtq_st
udents_from_meeting_at_a_public_university.html; See also David W. Dunlap, Judge Voids
an Alabama Law Against Gay Campus Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/31/us/judge-voids-an-alabama-law-against-gay-campusgroups.html.
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ability to protest speakers. These goals are not incompatible. Rather than
choosing winners and losers according to forum standards, there is a middle
ground that protects an array of student speech. Student speech zones should
be abolished, and student speech rights should be widely extended across
college and university campuses—limited only when speech or expression
would interrupt instruction, impede regular operations, or pose threats to
public safety. At the same time, legislators (and the courts) should be careful
not to undermine institutional autonomy by prescribing overly prescriptive
standards that can actually undercut student speech rights or that unwisely
seek to muzzle institutional speech on controversial issues on campus and
beyond.
Colleges and universities are expected to fulfill many societal goals;
in fact, some people argue that they are expected to be “all things to all
people.” In addition to providing spaces for student development through
speech and debate, colleges and universities are expected to protect campus
safety, cultivate civic engagement, promote student body diversity, create
welcoming learning environments for all groups of students, and be good
stewards of public funds and tuition dollars. Therefore, we argue that in times
of campus crisis, student speech should be considered in relation to various
elements of institutional missions. While there is a place for legal decisions
or statutes to assure a baseline of access for student speech, including in open
campus areas, some proposals go too far. We firmly believe that shared
governance processes that include administrators, faculty members, staff,
and students are more appropriately suited to resolving many speech disputes
than legislation that seeks to demand political neutrality from institutions or
to divest campus professionals of discretion concerning when students
should be subject to discipline for protesting campus speakers.

